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INFORMATION CHANNELS AND 
ENVIRONMENTAL DECISION MAKING 
HELEN M. INGRAM0 
Information is a political tracer element that delineates the 
channels of communication within a decision making process. Up 
until this decade, the channel from environmental interest to decision 
makers was negligible. Information on the economic efficiency or the 
regional development effects of actions affecting natural resources 
was much more salient than intelligence on environmental impact. In 
recent years, attempts have been made to generate more information 
upon the implications of natural resources policy and feed it into the 
decision making process. In particular, the National Environmental 
Policy Act1 is expressly aimed at accounting for environmental 
impacts of governmental decisions. 
The theory of this article is that the incremental and fragmented 
process by which decisions are actually made imposes important 
restraints upon the flow of information. The initial task is to catalogue 
and describe these restraints, then to identify the factors that affect 
channels of communication. \Vb.at determines which facts decision 
makers take into consideration? \Vb.at motivates the generation and 
transfer of information? This article will discuss the answers to these 
questions and the possibilities of improving the current environmental 
information basis. 
FACTORS AFFECTING WHAT DECISION MAKERS HEAR 
Classical formulations of problem solving involve the identification 
and ranking of goals, the cataloging of methods of achieving those 
goals and the investigation of the consequences of each alternative. 
Unfortunately, formulations do not provide an accurate description of 
decision making.2 Such a policy making process would compel a 
decision maker to reach out for all the related information to his 
problem and analyze it. The decision making strategy that Lindblom 
and Braybrooke call disjointed incrementalism is a better approxima­
tion of the real world.3 Only policies which differ incrementally from 
the status-quo are seriously considered, and, in consequence, decision 
makers focus upon a quite limited number of alternatives in making 
• Associate Professor of Government, University of Arizona; Former Staff Political Scientist,
National Water Commission. 
1. National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 42 U.S.C. 4321 et seq. (1970).
2. Lindblom, The Policy Making Process Ch. III, (1968); Dror, Public Policy Making
Reexamined 86-87 (1968). 
3. Braybooke & Lindblom, A Strategy of Decision: Policy Evaluation as a Social Process 
81-110 (1963). 
87 
choices. Further, not all the consequences of any alternative are, in 
fact, taken into account. There is a tendency among decision makers 
to concentrate on the direct and immediate effects of decision, 
discounting the remote, and imponderable, the intangible, and the 
poorly understood. The practical decision-making strategy dictates 
that a decision maker attend to the short run consequences in hope 
that the long run will take care of itself-or that some other decision 
maker in another setting will take care of it. 
The information needs of decision makers are restricted in this 
incremental and disjointed decision-making process. They are not 
required to listen to all the interests that may have a stake in any 
decision or to collect and weigh data on all possible impacts. 
Furthermore, they are barraged by more information than they can 
actually use in the limited choices they are comfortable in making. 
Information overload is a likely problem. The fact is that the 
receptivity of decision makers is screened by a number of considera­
tions. 
THE ISSUE CONTEXT affects what information the decision 
makers are receptive to. Over time, participants in a policy area 
develop a particular fix or conception of the dimensions of the issues 
involved. Information is sorted out and used in decision making on the 
basis of that conception, and data which related to another way of 
thinking about the issue is never really considered. Aaron Wildavsky 
explains the reluctance of the Eisenhower Administration to attend to 
the political dangers of the Dixon-Yates controversy in terms of the 
operative issue context. The Republican Administration conceived of 
the issue as a public versus private power controversy. Although there 
were numerous signals that the issue was likely to explode as a 
question of conflict of interest, agency offficials and Presidential 
advisers failed to take the cues. The information which might have 
proceeded early warning was filtered out.4 
The issue context of water quality was for years a matter of health, 
and information about the spread of communicable disease through 
water supply overshadowed data about aesthetics, recreation, and 
wildlife habitat. Water quality officials in the Department of Health, 
Education and Welfare were such captives of the issue context that 
they were unable to adjust to the changing dimensions of the question. 
Ultimately the inability of these decision makers to receive and 
process new categories of information led to the loss of HEW 
jurisdiction over water quality programs. 
Public works has been the issue context of a number of natural 
4. Wildavsky, The Analysis of Issue-Contexts in Decision-Making, Revolt Against the Masses 
(1971). 
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resource policies, particularly water development. A dam, a levee, or 
an irrigation project has been seen as a means to give local economies 
a shot in the arm. One Congressman, a senior member of the House 
Public Works Committee, expressed the following conception of the 
water development issue: 
A member of Congress from an arid western state, where 
dependable water supply has held back both industries develop­
ment and agricultural production, may perform his most effective 
service for the economic future of his region by the promotion of 
soundly conceived water resource developments. For a lawmaker 
representing a coastal area it may be the building of a sea wall to 
protect his town from the ocean's occasional ravages. H he serves 
a locality where recurrent flood hazards exist, his primary project 
may be the approval and eventual completion of a needed flood 
control measure by the Corps of Engineers. 5 
The relevant information when water projects are conceived in such 
terms includes the development possibilities of particular projects and 
the strength and unity of local support. Environmental implications 
are unlikely to be particularly salient. 
THE SOURCE OF INFORMATION, evaluated in terms of the 
decision maker's goals and interests, is a factor in determining its 
receipt and consideration. A decision maker can not simply make 
judgments, he must concern himself with building support for his 
decisions. He must take care of his ability to influence, and attend to 
the consequences of choices he makes upon his future ability to 
influence. A decision n:iaker is most apt to listen to information 
emitting from his constituency upon which he depends for continuing 
support. The antennae of Congressmen are directed toward picking 
up the preferences of individuals and groups important to their 
renomination and reelection. Agencies relate particularly to commu­
nications flowing from the groups served by agency programs-groups 
which ordinarily assist the agency's protecting or extending its 
authority budget and jurisdiction. Officials in the Soil Conservation 
Service (SCS) listen attentively to local soil and water conservation 
districts on proposed small watershed projects. The approval and 
active backing of local sponsors is crucial to agreements on cost 
sharing where local beneficiaries are required to pay back some 
portion, and continuous local efforts are necessary to push a project 
through the complicated authorizations and funding processes.6 The 
same attention is not directed by the SCS to information sources apart 
5. Wright, You and Your Congressman 49 (1965).
6. Allee & Ingram, Authorizations and Appropriations Processes for Water Resources
Development, Report to National Water Commission (1972). 
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.from the local sponsors. The frustration of the environmental agencies 
from their inability to get access to the decision making process in the 
SCS (and also the Corps of Engineers) was expressed by Nathaniel P. 
Reed, Assistant Secretary of the Interior for Fish and Wildlife and 
Parks before a Congressional hearing on channelization. 
A large portion of the morale problem within my Department is 
the result of rarely being listened to when we offer relevant 
recommendations to other agencies on this problem. It is 
discouraging for our biologists and field personnel to stand by 
helplessly and watch the wetlands resource succumb to the dredge 
bit or dragline bucket with little or no regard for the natural 
system.7 
Sources of information which are not supporters of decision makers, 
but which hold a recognized veto position over actions are heeded. 
Once environmental groups had collected substantial numbers of 
sympathetic Congressmen and Senators sensitive to their appeals, 
their reception by Interior and Public Works Committees changed 
markedly. Indicative perhaps is the fact that the mailing list for 
announcements of hearings and activities of the House Public Works 
Committee expanded from less than a dozen to more than 180 
environmental organizations in the decade of the 1970's. The concern 
of federal construction agencies for developing public participation 
programs is a function of their interest in forestalling the stalemates 
which have occurred in recent years with local conservation groups. 
In actuality, regulated groups often veto decisions of the 
governmental agencies assigned the task of regulating them. In the 
long run, enforcement of regulation depends upon voluntary com­
pliance. Because of physical and political constraints, regulators 
cannot take punitive action against every violator of standards if the 
violations are widespread. Consequently, the setting of standards, and 
the choice of whom to prosecute for non-compliance depends not 
only upon what it is reasonable to expect of the regulated industry, 
but also what the adverse consequences would be if the industry were 
prevented through enforcement action from carrying on its trade. 
Matthew Holden has convincingly described pollution control as a 
bargaining process.s Command of relevant information is a powerful 
resource which polluting industries have in bargaining. Holden says, 
To tell a firm to stop a certain discharge practice is to tell it to 
assume a cost which it has been able to pass on to someone else. 
7. Statement of Nathaniel P. Reed, Assistant Secretary of the Interior for Fish and Wildlife
and Parks, Before the House Government Operations Subcammittee, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1971). 
8. Holden, Jr., Pollution Control as a Bargaining Process: An Eoisay on Regulatory 
Decision-Making (Cornell Water Resources Center, Oct. 1966). 
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Yet this cannot be done without reference to whether or not the 
firm can afford to do so. In general, only the firm or industry itself 
is likely to have the relevant information on such matters as the 
importance of the firm or industry in the political economy, the 
nature of the product and process, and the related possibilities for 
technical adaptation. And the firm or industry is likely to be 
secretive, both because of the uses which its competitors might 
make of such information and because of the uses which public 
officials might make of it.9 
Regulators must establish a fund of good will, common interest and 
established links of communication with the regulated. In the end, 
this often means that regulating agencies are more receptive to 
information from the regulated industry than from environmental 
groups. Understandably then, the Federal Power Commission, at­
tuned to the electric industry's case for new sites, was not sensitive to 
information from conservationists about the consequences of licensing 
power plants such as Storm King until the courts directed the 
Commission to take the environment into account.10 
CONTENT OF INFORMATION affects its reception by decision 
makers. Dexter has illustrated the fact that a Congressman hears most 
often from those who agree with him, and that some men automati­
cally interpret what they hear to bolster their own viewpoints.11 
Agencies, too, seek out information which supports actions toward 
which they are already inclined. In his case study of the planning 
process within the Army Corps of Engineers on the DelMarVa 
Waterway, Leonard Shabman noted that the Corps paid meticulous 
attention to the Bureau of Sports Fisheries and Wildlife and the 
Bureau of Outdoor Recreation reviews of the Pocomoke Canal, a 
structure the Corps had no enthusiasm to build. A memo in Corps files 
affixed to unfavorable comments read, "This is exactly what we hoped 
to get from BOR. Beautiful example of interagency coordination."12 
Decision makers are particularly receptive to categories of infor­
mation which justify and legitimize their decision making process.13
Cost benefit analysis is favored information to legislators and natural 
resource agencies. The ratio of benefits to costs provides a rationale 
for not pursuing certain projects while at the same time the economic 
9. ld. at 33.
10. Scenic Hudson Preservation Conference v. Federal Power Commission, 354 F.2d 608 (2d
Cir. 1965). 
11. Dexter, The Representative and His District, New Perspectives on the House of 
Representatives 3-28 (1963). 
12. Shabman, DelMarVa Waterway Report, Cornell U. Water Resources & Marine Sciences 
Center (1972). 
13. Downs, Some Thoughts on Giving Peaple Economic Advice, 9 Am. Behavioral Scientist 
30-32 (1965). 
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tool is flexible enough to supply a justification to projects which have 
strong support. As Herbert Marshall put it, "one of the principal uses 
of benefit/ cost analysis is to clothe politically desirable projects in the 
fig leaf of economic respectability."14 Decision makers have a strong 
·· preference for kinds of information which can be applied to
politically viable solutions. Dean Schooler has pointed out that
physical technologies produced by the physical, medical, biological
and engineering sciences are favored by policy makers over beha­
vioral technologies which emerge from the political, social, economic
and psychological sciences. Behavioral technologies have the disad­
vantage to the decision maker of implying new life styles, shifts in
values and changed patterns of behavior which are likely to produce
conflict.15 It is far more difficult, for instance, to focus on the
behavioral requirements for reducing the demand for electric energy
than to concentrate upon a technical solution such as fusion to
generate more energy for everybody.
In a politically controversial situation, a decision maker is likely to
be receptive to information content which places the issue in new
terms amenable to settlement. An illustration can be found in the
Central Arizona Project debate revolving around the Grand Canyon
dams.16 The Bureau of Reclamation, historically a hydroelectric
power agency, would never have considered the financial support of
coal fired steam plants as a possible alternative to dams had not the
conservationists drawn a stalemate on the issue in Congress.
CHARACTERISTICS OF THE DECISION MAKER affect the
information that is rece'ived. The background and experience of a
decision maker screens his receptivity in favor of disciplines and facts
with which he feels familiar and comfortable, and the recruitment
patterns of an agency affects its ability to collect and assimilate data.
The dominance of engineers in federal construction agencies has
affected their bias toward construction solutions and their lack of
receptivity to environmental concerns. Indicative of the balance, in
the Army Corps of Engineers the Civil Works Study Board found that
of the 622 professionals whose sole responsibility was planning, 91
percent were engineers.17 Organizational militancy affects the kind of
data collected and the way it is fed into the decision-making process.
In his study of the Forest Service, Ashley Schiff found that research on
14. Marshall, Politics and Efficiency in Water Development, Water Research 294 (196.5).
15. Schooler, Political Arenas, Life Styles and the Impact of Technology on Policymaking, l 
Policy Sciences 275-87 (1970); Science and Public Policy (1971). 
16. A case history can be found in H. Ingram Patterns of Politics in Water Resources
Development: A Case Study of New Mexico's Role in the Colorado River Basin Bill, (1969). 
17. Civil Works Study Bd. of the Senate Committee on Public Works, 89th Cong., 2d. Sess. 
Civil Works Program of the Corp of Engineers (Comm. Print 1966). 
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controlled burning and the effect of vegetal cover on stream flow was 
heavily influenced by the doctrines which administrators found useful 
in promoting the agency. Research was too closely identified spiritual­
ly and structurally with "the cause" to impartially identify and 
investigate problems of forestry management.18 For similar reasons, 
the multidisciplinary staffing of the Soil Conservation Service has not 
affected any particular receptivity to alien ideas. The SCS is a very 
unified organization with strong centralized control.19 The agency's 
pattern of a "universalist" (what the well grained soil conservationist 
should be) is of the same cut regardless of discipline or area of the 
country. 
RULES AND REGULATIONS structure the formal behavior of 
organizations and give legitimacy to whatever information collected 
and transmitted according to the rules that is actually considered by 
the agency. It is doubtful, however, if rules can build certain 
information into the decision making process than would otherwise 
not be considered. ff the rules require that a decision maker consider 
data which imply large policy changes, then the decision maker is 
likely to bend the rules to fit the incremental strategy which is both 
more comfortable and safe. 
The Fish and Wildlife Coordination Act of 195820 is ambitious in its 
stated purposes. Equal consideration for fish and wildlife conservation 
along with other features of water resources development such as 
navigation, flood control and irrigation is supposed to take place. The 
rules in every construction agency require it to consult with the 
federal bureau and state game and fish departments whenever they 
propose major water development projects. There is no provision that 
conservation agency recommendations be accepted, however, and in 
practice conservation viewpoints affect decisions only when it suits 
the construction agency, or when a coalition of interests lends some 
muscle to the conservation viewpoint.21 
LEARNING CAPACITY affects a decision maker's receptivity to 
information. This complex notion merits a more lengthy discussion 
than is possible here, but in general learning capacity is related to the 
amount of uncommitted inner resources.22 An individual can restruc­
ture the way he responds to external information, provided he has 
certain resources to invest. He must command sufficient intellectual 
and emotional capability to recognize the inappropriateness of his 
present actions, and he must not be under stress. In the same way an 
18. Schiff, Fire and Water; Scientific Heresy in the Forest Service (1962). 
19. Hardin, The Politics of Agriculture 66 (1952). 
20. 16 U.S.C. 661 et seq. (1964).
21. Allee and Ingram, supra note 6, at ch. 3 & 7. 
22. For extended theoretical treatment see Deutsch, Nerves of Government (1966). 
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organization can, with adequate competent staff and budget and 
time, alter its reception of information. The process of adjusting to 
new sources of information is typically slow. Decision makers 
repeatedly encounter troublesome opposition and conflict and seek 
out ways to deal with negative feedback. Decisions are altered 
marginally and tentatively, as the decision maker tests for a more 
positive response. Through numerous incremental adjustments new 
channels of communciation are established. 
Decison makers, including resource agencies, differ in their ability 
to learn. Among them, the Army Corps of Engineers demonstrates 
better than average flexibility. It is responding to local conflict with 
an energetic public participation program, and is increasingly 
receptive to non-structural solutions to flood control problems. The 
chief's offiice has directed Corps divisions to come up with new plans 
directed toward urban problems. Most important, the Corps has 
responded to pollution with planning studies of regional waste 
management. This capacity to innovate is associated to some extent 
with the fact that the organization has some surplus resources. The 
size of its program, for instance, gives the Corps leeway to ex­
periment. Nearly three-quarters of all federal water development is 
under the aegis of the Corps. 
TIMING of information affects the nature of its reception. Chances 
are that decision makers will be most receptive to new information 
during the sorting out phase of an emerging issue. If a decision maker 
is uncertain about the values involved in the question, and about his 
risks and options, he is apt to be relatively open to all suggestions 
which appear helpful. Information is likely to have its greatest impact 
early in the planning process while the need for an airport, highway, 
dam, power plant or pipeline is still being discussed, and before a site 
is selected. Once the issue has been placed in a context, the decision 
maker will follow routine patterns and listen to regular sources. 
FACTORS AFFECTING WHAT INFORMATION IS 
GENERATED AND TRANSMITTED 
In a democratic society it is an accepted value that individuals and 
groups will have the opportunity to participate in or be represented 
in decisions that affect them.23 However, in the real world of 
fragmented, inconsistent and often incoherent policy, not every 
interest group participates in decisions that affect its concerns. The 
focus of interests is likely to be upon those dedsion points and 
decision makers where access and impact can be most easily 
achieved. 
23. Fox, Strategic Considerations in Attnining Water Planning Goals, J. Water Pollution
Control (1966). 
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The effective means of expressing most interests in the political 
system is through organizations, including interest groups and agen­
cies oriented toward particular interests. Whether or not an interest 
group or an agency spokesman for an interest voices its concern in 
decision-making depends upon its perception of the potential costs 
and benefits involved in generating and transmitting information. 
Such organizations' calculus is constrained by the hierarchy of 
importance among decisions affecting its interest and the budget of 
resources it has to expend in participating in decision making.24 The 
following factors affect an interest group's or interest oriented 
agency's willingness to generate and transmit information reflecting 
its concerns. 
THE PERCEPTION OF THE DECISION and what is at stake 
affects what information is generated and transmitted. An organiza­
tion's evaluation of what is at issue is a function of its goals and 
perceptions. The core interest of the traditional conservation move­
ment represented by such organizations as the Izaac Walton League, 
National Parks Association, Audubon Society, Wilderness Society, 
National Wildlife Federation, and Sierra Club is the preservation of 
natural areas through parks and other reserves. The decisions made by 
natural resource agencies are perceived as essentially developmental 
decisions fostering growth of particular industries and regions. For the 
most part decisions made by such agencies as the Bureau of 
Reclamation, the Corps of Engineers, and the Bureau of Public Roads 
is outside the purview of conservation. It is only when a park, wild 
river, or trout stream is threatened that the actions of these agencies 
become relevant. 
The newer envimomental groups, emerging in the 1970's have 
tended to focus on individual family consumptive decisions rather 
than governmental actors. The public has been directed to stop 
littering, use returnable bottles, use pollution free detergents, buy non 
leaded gasoline, reduce water and pesticide use, tune up autos and so 
on. Some observers see both the traditional conservation groups and 
new environmentalists currently altering their focus toward a wide 
range of public decisions. Governmental action is seen as a way of 
preserving the environment, and changes in present government 
decisions are viewed as essential if environmental quality is to be 
achieved.25 A new assessment by environmental groups of the role of 
public decisions in reaching environmental goals will foster the 
24. Shabman, Decision Making in Water Resources Investment and the Potential of 
Multi-Objective Planning: The Case of the Army Corps of Engineers ch. 4 (Cornell Water 
Resources and Marine Sciences Center 1972). 
25. Morrision, Hornback, & Warner, The Environmental Movement: Some Preliminary 
Observations, Social Behavior, Natural Resources, and the Environment, (forthcoming). 
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generation of different kinds of information designed to influence 
political actors. 
An interest group or an agency expressing a particular interest will 
react first to what it perceives as imminent and direct effects upon its 
interest .and will react later, with a lower order of effort, to questions 
with an indirect and remote impact. The direct impact of a dam, 
highway, or power plant is experienced in jobs, growth and profits. 
The indirect environmental implications are less immediate and 
much harder to predict. Partly for this reason, development interests 
have traditionally had more communications links with natural 
resources decision makers than have environmental groups. Because 
of the remote impact of planning decisions, conservation interests 
have not been motivated to make much of an input into planning 
studies. Nothing happens to many plans, even authorized ones, as 
illustrated by the fifteen billion dollar backlog of authorized water 
projects. If plans come to fruition, it is often far in the future. The 
average time for the planning and construction of civil works projects 
by the Army Corps of Engineers is currently seventeen years and 
eleven months. Construction agency planners have not traditionally 
made much effort to present their plans as important and immediate 
to conservation groups outside the regular constituency of the agency. 
Like other parts and decision making, the incremental strategy has 
restricted the scope of planning. 
THE EXPECTED IMPACT of information affects whether it will be 
transmitted and its content. The corollary of the notion that decision 
makers hear what they want to hear is that organizations will transmit 
information to decision makers when they believe it will get a 
hearing. The crucial points for stopping a dam or highway for 
conservation interests have not been on the local level where 
development benefits have their strongest appeal or within agencies 
whose mission it is to build public works. Instead it has been the 
national political leaders including members of Congress who have 
been open to conservationist persuasion. As a result opposition 
interests which fail to show up at agency hearings have a habit of 
surfacing later when projects reach a national decision making arena. 
The tremendous increase in citizen's suits attests to the willingness of 
environmental interests to prepare a case for whatever decision 
makers, in this case the judges, they perceive to be sympathetic. 
Federal review agencies which express conservationist and 
recreation interests, including the Bureau of Sports Fish and Wildlife, 
the National Park Service, and the Bureau of Outdoor Recreation, 
focus their comments on what they believe is achievable in the 
incremental process of decision making. Reviews tend to be pro-forma 
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unless the proposed project threatens an important interest. Even 
then the message of these agencies is seldom outright opposition since 
past experience has shown it is usually unsuccessful. Instead reviewers 
suggest changes in design and location of the project, and mitigating 
and compensating features such as recreational access and facilities, a 
wildlife sanctuary, fish hatchery, fish ladder etc. 
It is possible, of course, that environmental interests may despair of 
influencing particular decision makers and use public hearings to 
appeal to the broader citizen audience. In such cases environmental 
groups will talk past decision makers with a general message aimed at 
rallying supporters to the cause, and impart little to the decision 
maker which relates to the choices he has at hand. 
The RESOURCES of an organization affect what information it can 
generate and transmit. Unity and cohesion are important resources.26
The environmental movement has suffered from fragementation and 
internal division. The number of groups is growing as well as 
membership. The Council of Environmental Quality estimated that 
there are over 5,000 environmental organizations in the United 
States.27 These groups differ in their conceptions of environmental
quality. A unified strategy, even on limited specific issues, is often 
impossible for them to agree upon and execute. Very often environ­
mental groups are in competition for another important resource, 
membership. Up until recently lack of numbers has been a resource 
limitation. The Sierra Club, for instance, had only 30,000 members in 
1966. A great deal of the energy and resources environmental groups 
have has been plowed back into the organizations in membership and 
fund raising drives. 
The older conservation organizations have been mainly national 
organizations with a national appeal, but with only a few members 
scattered in localities. As a result, it has been much more possible to 
mount a national campaign than to stop a project on the local level. 
Thus the National Parks Association could cause the Bureau of 
Reclamation proposal to build Echo Park Dam great difficulties in 
Congress in the 1950's but could not dent the staunch support of Utah 
residents.28 
Data base and expertise is a requirement for meaningful participa­
tion in natural resources decisions. Much of the debate on issues such 
as nuclear reactor safety, thermal pollution, air and water quality 
measurements, etc. takes place in technical terms. Environmental 
groups have solicited the aid of biologists and foresters in testimony 
26. Truman, The Governmental Process 167 (1955). 
27. Council on Environmental Quality, Letter from Staff, 1973. 
28. Stratton & Sirotkin, The Echo Park Controversy (1959). 
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on clear cutting and have hired economists to do benefit cost analysis 
of water projects. The availability of experts on the staff or within the 
membership is a valuable resource. Without specialists, an organiza­
tion can not substantiate an independent position or even interpret 
data which comes in from outside. 
Lack of adequate staffing and budget have been persistent 
problems for the Bureau of Sports Fish and Wildlife in voicing the 
conservationist position. Up until a few years ago the River Basin 
Studies Division which has been assigned to review water develop­
ment proposals of the Army Corps of Engineers, the Bureau of 
Reclamation, and the Soil Conservation Service were dependent upon 
the lead construction agency to fund their evaluations. Today about 
half the budget for BSF and W review comes form outside. These 
budgetary restraints are compounded by other resource limitations 
which affect the kind of reviews it makes. A division handbook 
describes the difficulty of the River Basin Studies Planner. 
Usually he is operating against a deadline, frequently a short 
one-nearly always shorter than the lead planning agency-and 
often with less adequate tools and manpower. Nearly always, too, 
he has less adequate basic data and information than much that is 
available to the lead agency . . . The parameters dealt with by 
the RBS and lead agency planners are of different orders of 
complexity, variability and recognized utility. Thus the basic data 
on climate and hydrology have been long recognized as valuable 
to Man's welfare, while comparably basic data on fish and wildlife 
populations and their dynamics not only are less widely valued, 
but they are far more difficult to obtain.29 
The National Environmental Policy Act30 (NEPA) was designed to 
alter the existing channels of communication in policy making 
affecting the environment. The principal thrust of Section 102 (2) (C) 
was to establish a new "action-forcing" provision to assure detailed 
research and full consideration of environmental impacts in decision 
making. 3l Judged by the number of court cases which environmental 
organizations have won under NEPA directing government agencies 
to comply, the legislation has been a success. Citizen's suits have 
produced court orders blocking or delaying a variety of projects 
including the Alaska oil pipeline, <la.ms, highways, nuclear and 
29. River Basins. Studies Division, Bureau of Sports Fisheries and Wildlife, Procedures & 
Techniques of Fish and Wildlife Analysis & Planning. 
30. National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 42 U.S.C. 4321 et seq. (1970). (hereinafter 
cited as NEPA). 
31. Report on the Administration of the National Environmental Policy Act, Comm. on 
Merchant Marine and Fisheries, H.R. Rep. No. 316, 92nd Cong., 1st Sess. (1971). 
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hydroelectric power plants, canals and logging in national forests.32
There is considerable difference, however, between sand in the 
wheels of progress on specific projects and actually altering the 
patterns of communication in decision making. What impact has 
NEPA had on what decision makers actually hear, and what 
information is actually generated and transmitted? 
Section 102 of NEPA requires that all agencies of the Federal 
Government prepare detailed environmental impact statements on 
proposals for legislation and other major actions significantly affecting 
the environment. In impact statements agencies are directed to 
consider: (1) the environmental impact of the proposed action; (2) any 
adverse environmental effects which cannot be avoided should the 
proposal be implemented; (3) alternatives to the proposed action; (4) 
the relationship between local short-term uses of man's environment 
and the maintenance and enhancement of long-term productivity; 
and (5) any irreversible and irretrievable commitments of resources 
involved in the proposed action should it be implemented. In the 
process of preparing impact statements, federal agencies are to 
consult with other federal agencies which have jurisdiction, by law or 
special expertise, with respect to any environmental impact involved. 
Environmental statements and accompanying comments are to be 
made available to the President, the Council on Environmental 
Quality (CEQ) and the public and are to accompany proposals 
throughout the review process. The Council has issued guidelines, and 
each federal agency has developed or is working on formal procedures 
for preparing and processing 102 statements. 
NEPA AND DECISION MAKERS 
The ISSUE CONTEXT, or the framework in which a decision maker 
conceives a problem and the information he considers relevant is built 
up over time and experience and is highly resistant to change. The 
incremental model of decision making suggests that decision makers 
relate closely to past experience. They consider only alternatives 
which differ marginally from those taken into account in previous 
decisions. The informal rules of decision which dictate what informa­
tion is relevant and what can be dismissed are only loosely related to 
the formal rules and procedures with which the decision maker 
complies on paper. It is unreasonable to expect, then, that an 
alteration of formal procedure such as NEPA could, by itself, 
accomplish much change in issue contexts in established programs. 
There is ample evidence of a reluctance to change decision making 
procedure even formally. A number of Congressmen and administra-
32. Zeldin, Will Success Spoil NEPA, Audobon 106-11 (July 1972).
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tors see NEPA as introducing additional red tape. 33 The initial failure 
of agencies to comply with the procedural requirements of the act has 
led to a great deal of litigation. A spate of bills were introduced into 
the 92nd Congress to provide specific exemptions from NEPA. 34 And, 
even as agencies adjust to procedural requirements, and they are 
presently on the whole complying, it is still possible for decision 
makers to favor information on development rather than environmen­
tal impact. Although the environmental impact statement on the 
Alaska pipeline acknowledged severe environmental effects, the 
Secretary of the Interior recommended approval of the pipeline on 
the basis of economics and national security. 
NEPA requires that an agency preparing an impact statement 
obtain the comments of other Federal, State and local agencies having 
jurisdiction or special expertise on any environmental impacts 
involved. Under the Freedom of Information Act, 35 the agency must 
make draft statements and comments available to the public and any 
individual or organization may comment. The Council of Environ­
mental Quality receives statements and may also comment. Theoreti­
cally, then, agencies have broad sources of environmental information 
to call upon. Whether these SOURCES are actually considered in 
decision making depends partly upon the agency's evaluation of their 
political significance. No agency, including the Council on Environ­
mental Quality (CEQ), is authorized to veto a project proposed by 
another agency on the basis of an adverse environmental statement. 
CEQ prepares guidelines and monitors the preparation of environ­
mental statements. Under the law,36 it may, but is not required to 
comment. As part of the President's staff, CEQ can recommend that 
the President reject a project. This option was exercised in halting the 
Cross Florida Barge Canal, but otherwise has not often been used. As 
Presidential advisers, the informal persuasion of agencies by the CEQ 
may be effective. Chairman Russell Train told a Congressional 
Committee, "if we are troubled by a proposed action, either in whole 
or in part, we generally say so-and there have been cases, to my 
knowledge, proposals that have been withdrawn, never see the light 
_of day, if you will, I think because of our reaction."37 However, in its
33. Hearings on Red Tape-Inquiring into Delays and Excesssive Paperwork in Administmton
of Public Works Programs Before the Subcommittee of Investigations and Oversight of the 
Committee on Public Works, 92nd Cong., 1st. Sess. (1971). 
34. For a partial listing see National Wildlife Federation, Conservation Report No. 12, (Apr.
14, 1972). 
35. 5 u.s.c. 22(1964) .
36. NEPA.
37. Hearings on the Administration of the National Environmental Policy Act Before the 
Subcomittee on Fisheries and Wildlife Conseroation of the House Committee on Merchant 
Marine and Fisheries, 91st Cong. 1st Sess. 13 (1971). 
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review of the implementation of NEPA in seven agencies, the 
Comptroller General's office found that much of the formal and 
informal guidance given by CEQ to Agencies focused on the 
inclusiveness and quality of particular statements, not upon the 
procedure whereby statements were integrated into decision 
making.38 
Under its own legislative mandate, the Environmental Protection 
Agency (EPA) has a particular responsibility to review impact 
statements from the perspective of its broad environmental concerns. 
Responsiblity is different from vigorous effort, which the General 
Accounting Office Report, cited above, found wanting. The causes for 
failure to generate and transmit information relate to EPA's own 
perspectives and resources and will be discussed below. Whether or 
not EPA could become a significant source of environmental informa­
tion is related in part to its strength in Congress, the White House and 
with its own environmental constituency. 
Court decisions are of increasing concern to agencies. Failure to 
satisfy the courts has cost agencies troublesome delays. Up until the 
present the courts have concentrated upon the procedure required by 
NEPA, not the substance of decision making. If this stance is 
maintained the courts will become less salient as agencies meet the 
necessary procedures. In the Calvert Clijfs39 decision, a U.S. Court 
of Appeals held that if a decision is reached procedurally without 
individual consideration and balancing of environmental factors, 
conducted fully and in good faith, the courts will examine the weight 
of environmental information in the decision making process. Histori­
cally, however, courts have been reluctant to second guess agencies 
on the substance of decisions. 
Environmental considerations were given formal recognition in 
NEPA. As a result, environmental data gained stature and credibility 
with decision makers. However, agencies are reluctant to take 
information which is likely to produce conflict and make decisions 
more difficult to reach. It is logical to expect that an agency will 
include in draft and final statements the data which best supports its 
own decisions and decision making process. Left to their own devices, 
without external oversight, impact statements are likely to become 
justifications to environmentalists of what the agency has determined 
to do. 
NEPA promises to alter the CHARACTER OF DECISION 
MAKERS, and in the long run the changes it makes in agency 
38. Comptroller General, Report on Improvements Needed in Federal Efforts to Implement
the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (1972). 
39. 449 F.2d. ll09 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
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recruitment and personnel can significantly alter channels of commu­
nication. It takes life scientists to write environmental statements, and 
biologists are being brought into federal agencies in significant 
numbers. The Bureau of Reclamation, for example, has placed at least 
one G.S. 14 biologist in each of its regions to supervise the preparation 
of environmental impact statements. How much effect newly 
recruited individuals with environmental expertise have upon the 
receptivity of each to environmental concerns will vary according to 
the success with which the agency inculcates its traditional orienta­
tion and mission into its personnel and its learning capacity. 
The charge of Sec. 102 (a) (A) of NEPA to all agencies is a 
"systematic, interdisciplinary approach which will insure the inte­
grated use of the natural and social sciences and the environmental 
design arts in planning and decision making." Despite the recruit­
ment of life scientists, many agencies are as yet unable to comply. 
There is a paucity of funds to attract sufficient numbers of qualified 
people. More important, agency prospectives are currently too 
narrow to undertake a broad environmental overview. For instance, 
the Rocky Mountain Center on the Environment found that one 
Forest Service "102" statement had utilized an "interdisciplinary 
team" of six timber management specialists.40 
Environmental impact statements are apt to be post hoc 
evaluation, prepared after decision makers have settled upon a course 
of action. A specific project or action has become the center of 
attention in the decision making process by the time an environmen­
tal impact statement is introduced. The interest by this time within 
the agency and among their organizational backers is often to build 
support for the proposal, not to re-examine goals and needs. The 
General Accounting Office found that for the seven agencies they 
reviewed, impact statements were prepared in stages as proposals 
moved up the organzational levels toward the final stages of review. 
As a result a lower level did not have the benefit of all environmental 
aspects of a proposal prior to advancing it to the next organizational 
level. In some agencies, such as the Bureau of Reclamation and the 
Corps, even top officials did not have a completed statement when 
reviewing proposals.41 The Administration, Congress and the public
are allowed 90 days after publication of a draft statement and 30 days 
from the final statement to react before an agency can take action.42 
By this time it is likely that options are so narrowed and the proposal 
has accumulated such support that stopping it is difficult and costly. 
40. Hansen, NEPA: Problems and Outer Limits, (1972).
41. Comptroller General, supra note 38.
42. NEPA.
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NEPA AND ENVIRONMENTAL INTERESTS 
NEPA requires a statement presenting detailed information about 
every action with substantial effect upon the environment. It is 
possible that environmental interests will be prompted by this 
information into an awareness of stakes which were previously 
remote. The environmental impact statement may serve as alarm 
which activates distracted and latent groups. Whether or not environ­
mental groups react to the warning and attempt to establish channels 
of communication with agencies depends on their view of agency 
receptivity. Certainly such organizations have focused on impact 
statements as a means to get court delays. Courts have demonstrated 
their receptivity to environmental groups. Whether or not they are 
also perceived as a means to communicate with agencies in decision 
making is partly a function of the ability of environmental groups to 
generate and transmit information. 
A central question which experience will finally decide is whether 
environmental agencies and groups have ADEQUATE RESOURCES 
to make their views known to decision makers on the basis of 
environmental statements. Certainly conservation oriented agencies 
already engaged in making reviews of projects are likely to feel that 
NEPA has afforded them additional resources. The Bureau of Sport 
Fisheries and Wildlife and the Bureau of Outdoor Recreation are 
given additional legal basis for their claim of a say in actions affecting 
their interests. They now review impact statements as well as 
proposed actions in areas where they already have review preroga­
tive, and may consult in the preparation of environmental statements. 
These agencies however, still suffer from long-standing budgetary and 
staffing restraints which NEPA by itself cannot change. 
The volume of §102 statements circulated for comment and review 
on the national level threatens to become very large. By November, 
1971 draft or final environmental statements for 2040 actions had 
accumulated at CEQ. 43 A peak of 50 final and draft statements per 
day was anticipated. The Corps of Engineers' permit programs for 
waste discharges under the 1899 Refuse Act 44 could alone generate 
some 7,000 permits per year and, unless the law is amended, 
environmental impact statements are required on each one. Such 
numbers place a great strain on agencies such as CEQ and EPA and 
constitute an information overload. 
The Council of Environmental Quality, as most staff agencies of the 
President tend to be, is a very small organization. Its present staff is at 
43. Council on Environmental Quality, 1, 102 Monitor, no 10, 1971.
44. 33 u.s.c. 407, 411, 413 (1970).
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30 professionals, and many of these engage in matters apart from §102 
statement reviews. At the beginning of 1972, only one man 
covered all statements on environmental impacts of water projects 
proposed by the Corps, the Bureau of Reclamation and the Soil 
Conservation Service. Unless some federal conservation agency or 
environmental group brings a particular project to the reviewer's 
attention, environmental impact statements are apt to get no more 
than general oversight. CEQ's outlook upon its reponsibilities with 
regard to §102 statements are bound to be affected by the fact that 
the agency is designed to serve the President. It is unlikely that the 
President desires or can afford to become involved in large numbers of 
controversies over governmental activities detrimental to the environ­
ment. In consequence, CEQ is unlikely to openly challenge very 
many governmental actions. 
In light of the other demands upon its attention, the Environmental 
Protection Agency also faces severe limitations in regard to its review 
of environmental statements. EPA is a young agency, created in 
1970, and much of its resources are taken up in establishing its own 
internal organization. Further, EPA has a number of difficult regula­
tory programs to administer including water and air pollution, control 
of pesticides, radiation protection, and solid wastes management. It is 
likely that these activities have a priority over environmental impact 
statement review. The experience with EPA's handling of Environ­
mental Impact Statements has been that the agency is very slow. 
EPA's first listing of comments on statements was published in the 
Federal Register on January 18, 1972, approximately two years after 
the enactment of NEPA. The agency has complained to the CEQ that 
the quality of statements was poor, but with the exception of the 
Atomic Energy Commission, EPA has not yet sent guidelines to other 
federal agencies setting forth the type of information needed for EPA 
to carry on its review responsiblities.45
Environmental interest groups have problems similar to those of 
environmental agencies in exploiting NEPA. A survey of member 
organizations of the Natural Resources Council of America, a large 
coalition of groups, revealed that none had the necessary personnel to 
conduct an in-depth review of the volume of environmental state­
ments anticipated on specific projects. It was estimated that one 
man-day was necessary simply to determine the adequacy of an 
impact statement concerning a Corps of Engineers project and 
one-half man-day for a simple highway impact statement. An 
in-depth review would take much more staff time, varying according 
45. Comptroller General, supra note 38.
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to the complexity of the subject. In all cases it would be necessary for 
the reviewer to have detailed information of his own.46 
Independent detailed information about the impact of a proposed 
government action upon the environment most likely will come from 
local environmental interests familiar with the project area. The 
number of local environmental groups has increased impressively, and 
the growing membership of national groups has strengthened their 
local base. While a few years ago national interest groups called 
attention to impending degradations, now local groups exist to 
strongly oppose actions harmful to the environment on the local level. 
Communication between national and local levels on environmental 
statements remain a problem. Local groups will probably have to 
signal national organizations about projects proposed by field offices 
of federal agencies so that particularly important environmental 
statements can be sifted out and monitored. Timing, too, remains a 
significant problem for effective communications from environmental 
groups. The Rocky Mountain Center on the Environment estimates 
that it takes 80 to 90 days to react to a §102 statement. Agencies may 
well have taken action before interest groups can generate and 
transmit information.47 
CONCLUSIONS 
The National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 is being hailed as 
effective by its friends and foes alike. The National Audubon 
magazine has called it the "first effective environmental law of the 
land," while Senator Gordon Allott has said that it is a means of 
promoting mischief and should be reviewed, 48 and Secretary of 
Interior Rogers Morton has blamed NEPA for the delay in the 
department's activities to overcome the energy crises.49 Most of these
reactions are based upon the achievements of citizen lawsuits 
compelling government agencies to comply with the procedural 
requiremens of the Act. Evaluated in terms of the long term 
effectiveness in forging new channels of communication to broaden 
the environmental information base upon which public policy is 
made, proclamations of success are not yet warranted. 
NEPA has been examined here from the perspective of the 
incremental process of decision making. A great deal of relevant 
information is ordinarily outside the purview of any decision maker 
46. Natural Resources Council of America, Report of the Ad Hoc Committee On Environ-
mental Impact Statements (mimeo) (Aug. 12, 1971). 
47. Hansen, supra note 40.
48. Zeldin, supra note 32. 
49. Hearings on Fuel and Energy Resources Before the House Interior and Insular Affairs
Comm., 92nd Cong., 2d Session (1972). 
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who typically concentrates upon marginal alterations from the status 
quo. Information becomes relevant to the decision maker when he 
becomes convinced that it will help him, or that he cannot afford to 
ignore it. New rules and regulations are not likely, by themselves, to 
force a decision maker to take into account interests and concerns he 
would not otherwise consider, despite the claims of NEPA's sponsors 
that its provisions are action forcing. Instead, NEPA may facilitate 
change in communications channels where decision makers are 
already in search of alternatives to avoid the conflict with environ­
mentalists which have made their past patterns of decision-making 
uncomfortable. Realistically, it should be expected that receptivity to 
environmental interests will come about incrementally and unevenly 
among government agencies. The extent to which it happens depends 
upon the continuing strength and activity of environmental interest 
groups. The passage of NEPA can be viewed as an outcome of past 
failures of environmentalists to get the ear of decision makers. It will 
take the sustained effort of environmentalists to make it work. 
